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COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: ENFORCEMENT
OF AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
FUTURE DISPUTES
By PETER R. SONDERBY*
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a procedure whereby parties, by voluntary

agreement, submit a dispute for binding determination to private
unofficial persons of their own choice rather than to the regularly

established tribunals of justice.1 Commercial arbitration is a
specialized branch of arbitration dealing with disputes arising
under sales, construction, shipping and a wide variety of other
types of agreements.

2

According to its proponents, arbitration as a method of dispute settlement has a number of significant advantages over or-

dinary litigation. Those most commonly mentioned are: (1) it
is faster and less expensive; (2)

cision makers; (3)

the availability of expert de-

privacy, since arbitration proceedings are

not a matter of public record; and (4) the avoidance of the hostility which destroys business and other intimate relationships
when a dispute is litigated in the courts. 8
For these and other reasons, the parties to commercial and
other types of contracts frequently include as part of their
* Member of the Illinois Bar, associated with Chadwell, Keck, Kayser
& Ruggles. A.B., University of Illinois, J.D., University of Illinois College
of Law, Assistant Editor, University of Illinois Law Forum wherein he
published two articles. Member, Order of the Coif.
ISee M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (1968)

as DoMKE]; F. KELLOR,

AMERICAN

ARBITRATION

[hereinafter cited

4 (1948); K. Carlston,

The Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 631

(1952); W. Sturges, Arbitration - What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031
(1960).
2 DOMKE §1.01 at 3. For detailed discussions of some of the specific
uses of commercial arbitration, see Symposium: Arbitration and Antitrust,
44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1069 (1969); G. Asken, Resolving Construction Contract
Disputes Through Arbitration, 23 ARB. J. 116 (1969) : C. Bridge, Jr., Arbitration of Accident Claims, 54 ILL. B.J. 334 (1965) ; D. Collins, Arbitration
and the U.C.C., 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 736 (1966); R. Coulson, Family Arbitration - An Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 FAM. L.Q. 22 (1969); J. Dobkin,
Arbitrability of Patent Disputes Under the United States Arbitration Act,
23 ARB. J. 1 (1968): M. Domke, Foreign Trade Arbitration, 46 CHI. B. REC.
65 (1964); L. Kovin, Uninsured Motorist Arbitration Under the Illinois
Statute. 21 ARB. J. 229 (1966) ; H. Rudnick. Arbitration of Disputes Between Franchisors and Franchisees, 55 ILL. B.J. 54 (1966); J. Sembower,
Landlord-Tenant Arbitration, 24 ARB. J. 35 (1969); note, The Validity of
Arbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (1967);
note Arbitration as a Means of Settling Disputes within Close Corporations,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1963) ; note Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for
Intra-Close CorporateDisputes, 56 VA. L. REv. 271 (1970).
3 S. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration. 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846,
848-49 (1961); see C. Taeusch, Extra-judicial Settlement of Controversies,
83 U. PA. L. REv. 147 (1934).
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agreement a provision requiring arbitration of future disputes
which may arise thereunder. 4 However, when a dispute does in
fact arise, it is not uncommon that one of the parties (usually
the one against whom a claim is asserted) decides that perhaps
arbitration was not such a good idea after all and that the delays
and uncertainties of litigation would be more desirable. In such
a situation the party who wishes to arbitrate must find a means
to compel the recalcitrant party to live up to the arbitration
agreement. The purpose of this article is to provide a general
survey of the formal legal means which are available to compel
arbitration pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate future disputes
and to point out some of the problems which may be encountered
in attempting to utilize those means.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. At Common Law
At common law arbitration was viewed with disfavor and
this attitude persists today in some jurisdictions.- The origin of
the common law attitude is generally attributed to a dictum of
Lord Coke in 1609 in Vynior's Case., Involved there was an action of debt on a penal bond by Vynior against Wilde for the latter's breach of the bond for failing to submit a dispute to arbitration. At that time it was customary for the parties to arbitration
agreements to post such bonds to insure compliance with the
agreement and in accordance with the rule then prevailing, a
judgment was awarded to the plaintiff for the full amount of the
bond. 7 Although entirely unnecessary to anything decided in the
case Lord Coke nevertheless pointed out in his opinion that:
If I submit myself to an arbitrament . . . yet I may revoke it for
my act or my words cannot alter the judgment of the law to make
that irrevocable, which is of its own nature revocable.,
The impact of this dictum was not felt for 78 years until
1687 when Parliament enacted the statute of Fines and Penalties.' This legislation provided that execution on a judgment
entered upon a bond given for the performance of an agreement
4

The following is an example of a contract provision for the arbitration

of future disputes. It is recommended by the American Arbitration Association for insertion in all commercial contracts:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the
award may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.
1 MODERN LEGAL FORMS §594 (1963).
5 E.g., Green v. Wolff, 140 Mont. 413, 372 P.2d 427 (1962).
6 8 Coke Rep. 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B. 1069) ; see qenerally Wolaver,
The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
132, 138-39 (1934).
7 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 293 (1924).
8 8 Coke Rep. at 82a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 599-600.
9 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 2, §8.
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would issue only for the amount of damages actually sustained
rather than the entire amount of the bond. According to Lord
Coke's dictum in Vynior's Case an arbitration agreement was
revocable at any time, and this was construed to mean, under the
statute of Fines and Penalties, that the breach of an arbitration
agreement could give rise only to an action for nominal damages.10 Moreover, since an agreement to arbitrate future disputes was revocable at law, it could not be enforced in equity by
means of specific performance under commonly accepted equitable principles."
For a number of years, this rationale was applied by the
English courts in refusing to enforce agreements to arbitrate future disputes. 12 Several rationalizations were devised for this
rule of non-enforceability, the most popular being that arbitration agreements were against public policy because they "ousted
the jurisdiction of the courts."' 3 Finally, in Scott v. Avrey, 4
what came to be known as the rule of Vynior's Case was significantly modified. There it was held that although the parties
may not oust the courts from jurisdiction, they could agree that
no cause of action would arise until their dispute had been submitted to arbitration. On the basis of Scott v. Avrey and later
English decisions and legislation, the hostile attitude of the English courts towards arbitration gradually dissipated and today
agreements to arbitrate future disputes are fully enforceable
5
in England.1
The English "ouster of jurisdiction" concept based on Vynior's Case was adopted at an early stage in this country. 6 However, most courts here did not follow Scott v. Avrey and later
modifications of the English rule and continued to apply the rule
of Vynior's Case long after it had generally been abandoned in
England. Thus, for many years the state and federal courts almost uniformly held that executory arbitration agreements
10 See Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.
J. 595, 604 (1927).
11 Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 V. PA.
L. REV. 160 (1934).
12 E.g., Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wilson 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746);
Wellington v. Mackintosh, 2 Atk. 569, 26 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch. 1743); see
generally E. Wolaver, note 6 supra at 138-44.
'3 Kill v. Hollister, note 12 supra.
1425 L.J.Ex. 308; 5 H.L. Cas. 811; 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856).
In
Scott v. Avery, Lord Campbell claimed that the hostile attitude of the English
courts towards executory arbitration agreements was based primarily upon
the judges' desire to protect their incomes, since at that time there were
no fixed salaries and the judges were dependent almost entirely on fees for
their compensation. Id. at 313, quoted in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Co., 126 F.2d 978, 983 n. 14 (2d Cir. 1942).
15 G. Ellenbogen, English Arbitration Practice, 17 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 656 (1952).
16 See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313 (No. 14065)
(C.C. Mass. 1845); Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491, 496 (1858).
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would neither be granted specific performance nor form the basis
of a stay in an action at law 17 and this rule still obtains today
in some jurisdictions where the common rule law has not been
modified by statute. 8
B. Statutory Modifications
The courts' hostility towards executory arbitration agreements came under increasing judicial criticism in the 20th century9 but for the most part the courts continued to apply the

common law rule.20

The commercial interests of the country

were also quite dissatisfied with the common law rule and as a
result of increasing pressure from this sector,2'1 the New York
Arbitration Act of 1920 was finally enacted.22 This legislation
was the first of what may be termed the modern arbitration
statutes, providing, contrary to the common law rule, that agreements to arbitrate future disputes were irrevocable and setting
forth a procedure whereby a reluctant party could be compelled
to arbitrate in accordance with an arbitration agreement."
The New York Act provided the pattern and impetus for the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925,'4 the Uniform Arbitration Act
17 E.g., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 F. 405 (9th Cir. 1923) ; Cotalis v. Nazides,
308 Ill. 152, 139 N.E. 95 (1923); Meacham v. Jamestown F. & C. R.R., 211
N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914); contra, Park Constr. Co. v. Independent
School Dist., 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475 (1941) ; see generally, Annot.,
135 A.L.R. 79 (1941).
18 E.g., Green v. Wolf, note 5 supra; see notes 30-31 and accompanying
text, infra.
It should be noted that the courts' unfriendly attitude towards arbitration extended only to executory agreements to arbitrate and that from an
early date the courts in both this country and England were willing to enforce executed arbitration agreements i.e. ones which had ripened into
awards. See, e.g., Hall v. Hardy, 3 P. Wms. 187, 24 Eng. Rep. 1023 (Ch.
1733) ; Ballance v. Underhill, 4 Ill. 453, 459 (1842); see generally, Simpson,
note 11 supra, at 160. It has been argued that since the courts did enforce
arbitrators' awards, they were not really unfriendly towards arbitration, but
the truth seems to be that they were in fact unfriendly but simply did not
carry their hostility to its logical conclusion. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 983 n 11 (2d. Cir. 1942).
19 See, e.g., Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line 276 F. 319 (S.D.N.Y.
1921); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Petroleum Co., 222
F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (Hough, J.) ; Park Constr. Co. v. Independent
School Dist., note 17 supra.
20 See authorities cited, note 17 supra.
21 Note, Judicial Control of the Arbitrators Jurisdiction: A Changing
Attitude, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 521 (1963).
22 N.Y. Sess. Law 1920, c. 275, originally in N.Y. CIv. PRACT. AcT
§1448-69, now in N.Y. Civ. PRACT. LAW & RULES §§7501-14. (McKinney
1963).
23The essential aspects of a modern arbitration act are (1) irrevocability of an agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration, (2) power
of a party to invoke the assistance of a court to compel a recalcitrant party
to arbitrate, (3) power of a party to stay an action at law instituted in violation of an arbitration agreement, (4) authority of a court to appoint
arbitrators or fill vacancies when the parties fail to do so, (5) restriction
on the courts' ability to review the findings of fact and application of law by
the arbitrator, (6) specifications of a limited number of grounds upon which
an arbitrator's award may be attached. DOMKE §4.01, at 20.
24 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 76.
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of 1955,25 which has been enacted in several states26 and a num27
ber of other state arbitration acts.
Today there are 23 states in addition to New York with
modern arbitration acts providing for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes. Of these, seven have adopted
the Uniform Act in its entirety or with minor changes 28 and the
other 16 have adopted some other form of act containing some
or
29
all of the essential elements of a modern arbitration statute.
In the remaining 26 states a modern arbitration statute has
not been enacted. In 22 of these the statutes in existence permit
only the arbitration of present disputes.3 0 In the remaining four
states there are no statutes at all concerning arbitration and the
common law rule applies2 1
PROCEDURE UNDER MODERN STATE ARBITRATION STATUTES

Generally an agreement to arbitrate future disputes may be
enforced under state law only in those states where a modern
arbitration statute has been enacted. 2 Because of the many
variations which exist, a comprehensive review of the procedure
28 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1947).
See statutes cited, note 28 infra.
See statutes cited,
note 29 infra.
28 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§12-1501 to 1517 (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§682.01-.22 (1969); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, §§101-23 (1969); MAINE
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 706, §§5927-49 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 7, §§1-23
(1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§1-19 (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§572.01-30 (Supp. 1963), Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§1-1048 to 1048.21 (Supp.
1969).
28 CAL. CODE CIV. PRAC. tit. 9, § 1280-94 (West Supp. 1969); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§52-408 to 424 (1968); HAWAII REV. LAWS §§658-1 to 15
(1968); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§417.010 to .040 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§9:4201-17 (1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. §27A.5001-.5035 (1962); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§542:1-10 (1955); N.J REV. STAT. §§2A:24-1 to 11:24-11
(1962); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2711.01-.15 (Supp. 1968); ORE. REV. STAT.
§33.210-.340 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. S §§1-181 (1969); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§10-3-1 to 20 (1956); TEX. REV. STAT. ant. 224, 238-6 (1969
Supp.); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. §7.04-010 to 220 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§298.01-.18 (1957).
30 ALA. CODE tit. 7 §§829-44 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-501 to 510
(Supp. 1967); COLO. RULES OF CIV. PROC., ch. 16 R. 109 (1963); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10 §§5701-06 (1953) ; GA. CODE ANN. 4§7-101 to 111, 7-201 to 224
(1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§7-901 to 910 (1963); IND. STAT. ANN. §§3.201220 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. §679.1-.19 (1964); KAN. REV. STAT. §§5-201
to 213 (1969) ; MISS. CODE ANN. §§279-97 (1956); MO. REV. STAT. §§435.011.280 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§93.201-1 to 10 (1947); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§25.2103 to .2120 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. §§38.010-.240 (1969); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§22-3-1 to 8 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-544 to 567 (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§32-29-01 to 21 (1959); CODE OF LAWS OF S.C. §§10-19011905 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§23.501-519 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§78-31-1 to 22 (1953) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§55-10-1 to 8 (1965).
31 These states are Alaska, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Vermont.
There is no arbitration statute specifically applicable to the District of
Columbia, however, the Federal Arbitration Act applies there. 9 U.S.C.
§§1-2 (1947).
82 Green v. Wolf, note 5 supra; contra Park Constr. Co. v. Independent
School Dist., note 17 supra.
26
26

27
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in all states having such statutes will not be attempted. Instead,
the focus will be on the procedure followed in Illinois where the
Uniform Act with minor modifications has been adopted,33 and
where the procedure is typical of that utilized in other states having modern arbitration statutes.
Section 1 of the Illinois Act 3 4 declares, contrary to the common law rule, that:
[A] provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration in controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
In Section 2 the Act provides for the enforcement of the
contracts specified in Section 1.5 Where a party has refused to
arbitrate in accordance with an agreement, the other may apply
for an order compelling arbitration. The application is made by
motion and is heard in the manner provided for the making and
hearing of motions in civil cases.36 Notice of the initial applica37
tion is served in the same manner as a summons in a civil case.
The initial application must show an agreement to arbitrate
of the type made valid by Section 1 and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate in accordance with the agreement. Upon making such a showing, "the court shall order the parties to proceed
with arbitration. ' 3 8 However, if the party against whom an order is sought denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate,
the court summarily determines that issue. If it is found that
there was no agreement to arbitrate, the moving party's order is
denied. So that judicial involvement in the arbitration process
is minimal, the court is specifically directed not to consider the
merits of the dispute itself.89
The same procedure is followed where a party breaches an
arbitration agreement by bringing the court action relating to a
dispute covered by the arbitration agreement. If the suit is
brought in a court which would have jurisdiction to hear an initial application, the order for arbitration is sought there. Otherwise, subject to venue requirements, the application may be
brought in any other court having jurisdiction. Upon the filing
33

8See generally, Introducto7ry Note, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10 (Smith-

Hurd 1966).

3ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10 §101 (1969).
85Id. at 102.
38

Id. 115.
7 Id.
8
3 Id. at §102(a).
89 "An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that
the claim in isue lacks merits or bona fides or because of any fault or grounds
for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been shown." ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 10, §102(a) (1969).
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of the application, the pending court action is stayed, and if the

application is granted, the stay continues.4
Subsequent provisions of the act deal with various aspects
of the arbitration proceeding itself. The manner of selecting
arbitrators is specified, 41 and the notice and manner of holding
the arbitration hearing is set forth where these matters are not
covered by the arbitration agreement. 42 In addition, the parties'
right to representation by an attorney is guaranteed.4
The arbitrators are authorized to issue subpoenas, administer oaths and
authorize the taking of depositions.4
Upon application of a
party the arbitrator's award is confirmed by court and thereafter
may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or decree in
a civil case.4 5 Upon application of a party, an arbitrator's award
4 6
may be vacated but only for limited and specific causes.
PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION. ACT

Another modern arbitration statute which provides for the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes is the
United States Arbitration Act of 1925. 4 7 For a number of reasons a party seeking arbitration may find it necessary 48 or de40 Id. at §102 (c).

Id. at §103. This provision differs from the Uniform Act in that it
provides that the entire arbitration agreement terminates when the arbitration agreement does not provide for a method of choosing arbitrators and
the parties cannot agree upon the appointment of arbitrators. Under the
41

Uniform Act, the court chooses arbitrators in such a case. Introductory Note
ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 10 (Smith-Hurd, 1966).
42

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, §105(a) (1969).

43 Id. at §106.
441d. at §107.
4Id. at §114.
46 An arbitrator's award may not be set aside or reviewed on the basis of
an erroneous determination of law or fact but only for fraud, partiality and
other specified procedural grounds. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, §112 (1969).
47 9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Act);
see generally, DOMKE §4.03.
48 A modern state arbitration statute may be unavailable because the
state in which the party wishes to compel arbitration may not have enacted
such a statute.

See notes 30-31, supra, and accompanying text.

In some

instances even if a modern arbitration statute has been enacted in the state,
it still may not be available. For example, the Illinois Act is expressly
applicable only to agreements made after its effective date, before which
time agreements to arbitrate future disputes were unenforcible. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 10, §119 (1969).
Thus, an agreement to arbitrate future disputes
made before 1961 presumably could not be enforced in the Illinois courts
under the Illinois Act. But see the court's dictum in R.E.A. Express v.
Missouri Pac. R. Co. 447 S.W.2d 721, 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) to the
effect even though an arbitration agreement is unenforcible under state
law, it can be enforced in the state courts under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Even if the applicable state act covers the arbitration agreement involved, there may be some additional barrier precluding its use. For example,
by statute in New York, agreements to arbitrate claims barred by the statute
of limitations will not be enforced by the New York state courts. N.Y. Civ.
PnAc. §7502(b). There is no comparable federal statute and under federal
decisional law, the statute of limitations is not in itself a bar to arbitration.
E.g., Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Harrison and Crosfield, Ltd. 204 F.2d
366 (2d Cir. 1953) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 854 (1953).
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sirable49 to utilize this rather than one of modern state acts discussed in the preceding section. But before he can do so, certain
jurisdictional requirements must be met.
First, as under the modern state acts, the arbitration agreement must be in writing.50 Secondly, the moving party must
show that the United States District Court where arbitration is
sought would have jurisdiction of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, absent the
arbitration agreement. 51 In the usual non-admiralty case involving private parties, this requirement will be satisfied by showing
5
that jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship exists. 1
Finally, the arbitration agreement must be contained either
in a contract involving a "maritime transaction" or a "contract
'5 3
evidencing a transaction involving commerce.
Generally in a non-admiralty case the focus of the parties'
49 The party may simply prefer to litigate in the federal court rather
than in the state court. Also, it may be that the decisional law under the
Federal Act favors the moving party on a point which he anticipates might
be raised. For example, a defense frequently asserted to an action to compel
arbitration is that the contract containing the arbitration clause was fraudulently induced. The decision under the Federal Act hold that such a claim
is to be decided by the arbitrator rather than the court while in some states
it is held that such a claim must be decided by the court before arbitration
will be ordered. Compare Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (1968) with Murphy v. Morris, 12 N.J. Super. 544, 80 A.2d
128 (1951) ; see generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 936 (1963). Since the party
seeking arbitration generally prefers to have the leverage of an order compelling arbitration as soon as possible, he would most likely choose to move
for an order compelling arbitration in the federal court rather than a state
court in which the opposing party could delay matters by raising the
fraudulent inductment defense. See e.g. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and
Conklin Mfg. Co., supra; Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,
271 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960)
(holding that since the Federal Act is based on the commerce power, federal
rather than state law governs proceedings under the Act even though
jurisdiction may be based upon diversity of citizenship).
50 9 U.S.C. §2 (1947) ; see note 53, infra.
51 9 U.S.C. §§3-4 (1947), see 28 U.S.C. §§1331-62 (1947) (jurisdiction
of district courts).
52 28 U.S.C.A. §1332 (1970) (citizens of different states; citizens of a
state or different states and foreign states; amount in controversy exceeding
$10,000) ; see generally 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.76-78 (1964).
53 This requirement is found in Section 2 of the Act which specifies
the types of agreements to which the Act is applicable and contains the
general declaration of the policy of the Act:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C.A. §2 (1970).
The terms "maritime transactions" and "commerce" are defined and the
exceptions to the Act are set forth in Section I :
'Maritime transactions', as herein defined, means charter parties,
bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other
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and the court's attention will be on the question of whether the
latter requirement can be met. On its face, the statutory language - "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" - does not appear to involve the full scope of Congress'
power over commerce.5 4 In other acts Congress has defined commerce to include activity which merely "affects" commerce.

5

Here, of course, commerce is not so broadly defined. Furthermore, the Federal Act contains no declaration of a national interest to be served or a national regulatory scheme to be created.
Finally the quoted language appears to establish a formalistic
test whereby the sole determinant of whether commerce is present is the face of the contract itself. For these and other reasons, it has been asserted that the Federal Act was intended to
be of limited scope, for example, applicable only to contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods, 5 and
5
completely inapplicable in diversity of citizenship cases. 7
However, these arguments favoring a restrictive interpretation have not generally prevailed and the trend of the decisions
has been to broadly construe the commerce requirement. Particularly pertinent in this regard is the recent Supreme Court
decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co.

58

In that case, Prima had purchased the business of F.&C. Co., a
New Jersey paint company serving customers in various states,
and, as a result of the purchase, F.&C.'s business operations
were moved to Maryland. The purchase contract did not contain an arbitration clause. Rather, this was contained in a rematters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would
be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; 'commerce', as herein defined, means commerce among the several states or with foreign nations,
or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia,
or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any state or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia
and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained, shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.
9 U.S.C.A. §1 (1970).
S54See generally Note, Scope of the United States Arbitration Act in
Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 468,
476, n. 43 (1963); Note, Commercial Arbitration in The Federal Courts,
20 VAND. L. REv. 607 (1967).
55E.g., Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §51 (1954);
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §152 (7) (1965); Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (public accommodations), 42 U.S.C.A. §2000a.(b) (1970) ; see
Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) where it was
stated that the operation of a motel in one state involved "commerce" for
the purposes of the federal securities laws but not for the purposes of the
United States Arbitration Act.
56 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 409
(1967) (dissenting opinion).
57 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 208 (1956) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring opinion).
58 Note 56 supra.
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lated consulting agreement whereby F.&C. and its principal officer were to furnish consulting services to Prima. There was no
indication that these services were to be furnished at any other
place than Prima's offices in Maryland. Nevertheless, the court
held that since the consulting agreement was tied to the transfer
of F.&C.'s business to Maryland and the operations of an interstate business, there "could not be a clearer case of a contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce." 9 In addition, the
court noted that the application of "commerce" in the arbitration act was not limited merely to contracts between merchants
for the interstate shipment of goods but that the legislative intent was that it reached not only physical interstate shipment of
goods but "also contracts relating to interstate commerce." 60
The decisions of the lower courts are generally consistent
with the Court's broad definition of commerce in PrimaPaint and
it appears that even if all acts under a contract take place in one
state an arbitration agreement contained therein will nevertheless come within the coverage of the Federal Arbitration Act as
long as some relationship to interstate commerce can be shown.6 1
Assuming that the jurisdictional requirements are met, the
procedure followed for compelling arbitration under the Federal
Act 62 is quite similar to that followed under the Uniform and
other state acts.
Under Section 4 a party seeking arbitration may petition a
United States district court in the district where arbitration is
sought for an order compelling arbitration. Written notice of
the application for an order to compel arbitration must be served
upon the party in default at least five days in advance of the
hearing, in the same manner as a summons is served in a civil
case. At the hearing, the party seeking arbitration must show
that neither the agreement for arbitration nor the failure to
comply therewith is in issue and upon such a showing the court
59 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967).
60 Id. at 401, and n. 7.
61 E.g., Metro Indus. Painting Co. v. Terminal Const. Co., 287 F.2d 382
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961) ; Garfield & Co. v. Wiest,
308 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; Younker Bros., Inc. v. Standard Const.
Co., 241 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Iowa 1965) ; O'Meara v. Texas Gas Transmission
Corp., 230 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Il1. 1964).
62 The language of the enforcement and other provisions of the Federal
Act would appear to require that any proceedings thereunder be held in a

United States district court. However, it has been suggested that the Federal
Act constitutes a declaration of national policy as to the validity and enforce-

ability of the agreements specified in Section 2 (quoted in footnote 53, supra)
and as such, is equally applicable in state or federal courts. Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., footnote 49, supra; REA Express Co. v.

Missouri Pac. R. Co., footnote 48, supra.
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will order arbitration. Where those issues are raised, the party
63
in default may demand a jury trial of them.
Where a suit is filed in connection with a dispute covered by
an arbitration agreement a defendant who wishes to arbitrate
may, under Section 3, move in the district court in which the suit
is pending for a stay pending arbitration, provided that he can
show that the issues involved are referrable to arbitration and
that he is not himself in default under the arbitration agree6 4
ment.
The remaining sections of the Federal Act are similar to the
Uniform Act, providing for the appointment of arbitrators and

other remedies designed to insure compliance with the arbitration agreement.6 5
63 Section 4 provides as follows:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may
petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement,
would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty
of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between
the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement. Five days' notice in writing
of such application shall be served upon the party in default. Service
thereof shall be made in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing
the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be
within the district in which the petition for an order directing such
arbitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement of the
failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court
shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute
is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such
issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default
may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the
notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such
demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to
a jury in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
or may specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury find that no
agreement in writing for arbitration was made or that there is no default
in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury
find that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that
there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order
summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
9 U.S.C.A. §4 (1970).
64 Section 3 provides as follows:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is
pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with
such arbitration. 9 U.S.C.A. §3 (1970).
65 9 U.S.C.A. §§5-14 (1970).
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ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE IN CONNECTION
WITH A PROCEEDING To COMPEL ARBITRATION

The Federal Act and the typical modern state arbitration
acts discussed in the preceding sections strictly prescribe the issues which may be considered in a proceeding to compel arbitration or to stay a court action pending arbitration. Generally
these include only the questions of whether (1) there was an
agreement to arbitrate and, (2) whether there was a refusal to
arbitrate under the agreement.66 Once the party seeking arbitration has met these prerequisites, the typical statute leaves the
court no discretion as to whether an order compelling arbitration should issue.
The purpose of these limitations is to keep judicial involvement in the arbitration process at a minimum, 7 but despite them,
a number of defenses can be raised by the party resisting arbitration and a proceeding to compel arbitration can become a rather
involved affair. The following is an illustrative review of cases
dealing with some of the defenses commonly raised.
A.

Absence of Agreement to Arbitrate

A defense specifically authorized by statute is that there
was no agreement to arbitrate. This defense is generally raised
in cases where the arbitration clause is contained, not in the
parties' contract, but instead in some document referred to or
mentioned therein. 68 In general, if under accepted principles of
contract law, the requirements for incorporation by reference
have been met, 9 arbitration generally will be ordered even though
the party resisting arbitration may claim that he was unaware of
the existence of the incorporated arbitration provision or that
he did not intend the arbitration provision to be incorporated.
Illustrative in this regard is Level Export Corp. v. Wolz,

Aiken & Co. 7 0 There the parties entered into two identical contracts whereby the petitioner agreed to purchase a quantity of
cotton from the respondent. Each contract contained the following provision:
This Salesnote is subject to the provisions of Standard Cotton
Textile Salesnote which, by this reference, is incorporatedas a part
of this agreement and together herewith constitutes the entire contract between buyer and seller. No variation therefrom shall be
valid unless accepted in writing.71
66

E.g., 9 U.S.C.A. §§3, 4 (1970) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, 102 (1969).
Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568
(2d Cir. 1968) ; Layne-Minnesota Co., v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota,
266 Minn. 284, 123 N.W.2d 371 (1963).
68 See generally Annot. 41 A.L.R.2d 863 (1955).
69 17A C.J.S., CONTRACTS §299 (1963).
70 305 N.Y. 82, 111 N.E.2d 218 (1953).
71 Id. at 84, 111 N.E.2d at 219. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
67
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The Standard Cotton Texti'e Salesnote which was referred
to in quoted language contained a provision requiring that any
controversy arising under or relating to contract be settled by
arbitration. A dispute subsequently arose under the contract
and the respondent instituted arbitration proceedings; however
the buyer refused to appoint an arbitrator and moved for a stay
of the arbitration on the ground that no arbitration agreement
existed between the parties, and this motion was granted by the
lower court.
Petitioner admitted that it executed the contracts but
claimed that it was at no time informed that the Standard Cotton Textile Salesnote referred to contained any provision requiring arbitration and that it was not a member of any textile trade
association and was not familiar with the provision referred to.
It further claimed that it was unaware that any arbitration
clause existed until the controversy arose and that at no time did
the respondent call the arbitration provision to its attention.
However, according to the court, "difficult it would be to find
words more clearly to express the contractual intent of the parties."7 2 Moreover, the court noted that there was no claim in
that the petitioner was mislead by the words or conduct of the
respondent that disputes between the parties would be settled
other than by arbitration. The court thereupon remanded the
cause with instructions that arbitration be ordered, relying upon
the contract principal that a party to a written contract is bound
by the provisions thereof whether he reads them or not and that
ignorance through negligence will not relieve a party from his
contractual obligations."
A similar result was reached in Brown v. Gilligan, Will &
Co.,7 4 which involved a dispute between stock exchange members.
A lawsuit was pending between them and one moved for an order
staying the action until arbitration had been had between them
pursuant to the Constitution and Rules of the American Stock
Exchange which contained provisions requiring arbitration. The
party resisting arbitration claimed that arbitration was not required inasmuch as there was no agreement between the parties
to arbitrate the dispute in question. After noting that both the
party seeking arbitration and the party resisting arbitration
were member firms of the American Stock Exchange, the court
pointed out that:
Most exchanges require applicants for membership, as a prerequisite to admission, to sign the constitution of the exchange or an
agreement to be bound by its provisions. But whether or not ex72Id. at 86, 111 N.E.2d at 220.

Id. at 86-88, 111 N.E.2d at 220-21.
4 287 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y, 1968).
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press written assent is demanded, every member, by virtue of his
admission, contracts to be governed by the conditions of membership which the exchange has imposed. These conditions are, therefore, binding on the members, and constitute virtually a body of
law by which the members are governed in their dealings with the
exchange and with each other.
Since the rules of the exchange 'constitute a contract between the
members, the arbitration provisions which they embodied have
contractual validity.'7 5
But where the intention to incorporate an arbitration provision is not clearly expressed or where it appears that injustice
might result, the courts have refused to compel arbitration. One
such example is In re American Rail & Steel Co.7 6 There the
parties entered into a contract for the purchase of a quantity of
used steel rails and bars. The purchase order contained the language:
This Contract is placed in accordance with the conditions of contracts Form ISM 826 Rev. Copy attached and can be modified or
supplemented only in writing and signed by both parties hereto.77
One of the paragraphs of the above-mentioned form provided that disputes arising in connection with the contract should
be submitted to arbitration.
When a dispute arose under the contract, the purchaser, who
had provided the purchase order, demanded that it be settled
by arbitration. The seller then moved for a stay of arbitration,
defending on the grounds that arbitration was not called for inasmuch as the purchase order did not expressly mention it, the
form referred to in the order was not attached and its contents
were not otherwise brought to the seller's attention. It was not
clear whether the form was in fact attached but the purchaser
contended that its omission would not change the situation. However, the court reversed the order below and ordered that arbitration be stayed on the basis that:
a court cannot say that the intent to arbitrate was so clearly
expressed as to warrant a direction
that the parties proceed to
78
settle their dispute by arbitration.
Another such case is Northridge Cooperative Section No. I
8
Inc. v. 32nd Ave. Construction Corp.,"
where the court held that
an arbitration clause contained in a printed document and referred to in the parties' brief construction contract was not incorporated therein where it appeared that the true principals
were not shown or aware of the arbitration clause and the per75 Id. at 769-70.
78 308 N.Y. 577, 127 N.E.2d 562 (1955).
77 Id. at 579, 127 N.E.2d at 563.
78 Id. at 580, 127 N.E.2d at 563.
79 207 Misc. 827, 139 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1955).
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sons who executed the contract on their behalf were apparently
nominees of the other party to the contract and derelict in their
fiduciary duty to the party resisting arbitration.
Dispute Not Covered By the PartiesArbitration Agreement
A defense sometimes raised is that the dispute in question
does not fall within the terms of the parties' arbitration agreement. In other words, the existence of an arbitration agreement
is admitted, but it is claimed that the dispute is not within its
scope. This defense was often successful in the cases decided
during the early days of the modern arbitration acts when the
courts retained much of their traditional hostility towards arbitration.8 0 However, over the years, the courts' views as to their
role in the arbitration processes has changed, and today, questions as to the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement are
generally left, at least initially, for the arbitrators.
B.

The present view was well expressed in Layne-Minnesota Co.
v. Regents,81 one of the leading cases construing the Uniform
Arbitration Act. 2 Layne involved a dispute between an owner
and contractor as to whether their contract required them to submit to arbitration a dispute arising over a claim for additional
compensation occasioned by unanticipated difficulties in completing the work. According to the court, the language of the contract did not clearly express the intention of the parties as to
whether such disputes would be covered by the arbitration provisions contained therein. Further, the court noted that the
language of the contract provided a reasonable basis to support
80 For example, in Young v. Crescent Dev. Co., 240 N.Y. 244, 148 N.E.
510 (1925) a contract between the parties for the construction of a number
of houses contained the seemingly broad arbitration provision that: "All
questions that may arise under this contract and in the performance of the
work thereunder shall be submitted to arbitration." Id. at 247, 148 N.E.
at 510.
Disputes arose between the parties which included a claim by the cons
tractor that it was entitled to damages from the owner because the owner
had delayed it in the performance of the contract. The contractor's application for an order requiring arbitration of this claim was granted by the
courts below. However the New York Court of Appeals reversed, adopting
what would appear to be a highly technical and strained interpretation of
the above quoted arbitration clause. According to the court, the acts of
the owner occasioning the delay:
. . . were not done under and in performance of the contract, but in
violation of it and in repudiation of its provisions. There is involved
no interpretation of [the contract's] meaning, but a willful refusal to
be bound by it and, as it seems to me, [the arbitration] clause was intended to cover controversies which do not deny but seek an interpretation of and submission to its provisions; an attitude which seeks action
under the contract and not one outside and in denial of it.
Under this view, it appears that any time a dispute could be characterized
as involving a "violation" of the contract, arbitration could be resisted.
81 266 Minn. 284. 123 N.W.2d 871 (1963).
82 See generally M. Pirsig, Arbitrability and the Uniform Act, 19 AiM. J.
154 (1964).
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both defendants' contention that the dispute in question was not
covered as it did for the plaintiff's contention that it was.8"
The court refused to decide on the merits of the opposing
contentions of the parties. Instead, based on the language of the
Uniform Act,8 4 the court felt that:

• . . where upon application to compel arbitration the court is unable to ascertain the clear intent of the parties as to the scope of the
arbitration clause in a contracts, the sole issue is whether or not
an agreement to arbitrate exists.
Where the parties are in conflict as to the scope of the provision
for arbitration, and the question of the parties' intention as to
such scope is reasonably debatable, the problem arises as to whether
the court or the arbitrator shall decide the question. We believe in
such cases the rule should be, and we hold, that the issue of arbitrability be initially determined by the arbitrators subject to a
party's right reserved in [UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §12] to challenge such determination subsequent to any award. Such a rule is
consistent with the purpose and objectives of the Uniform Act.
It would also be more likely to coincide with the intent of the
parties who, by failing to precisely delineate the controversies to
be arbitrated, probably chose broad language for the purpose of extending arbitration to unforeseeable disputes. To construe [UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §2] to authorize a preliminary judicial
determination of whether or not the applicant presented an issue
referrable to arbitration would be to add non-existent language.
Such construction, in many instances, might be destructive of the
arbitration clause itself. The contents of the written request for
arbitration would take on the aspects of a pleading; and where no
evidence was submitted to the court, technicalities never intended
to be used in arbitration proceedings could be controlling. 85
This reasoning has been adopted in other states where the
Uniform Act has been adopted 8 and is the same reasoning applied by the federal courts in their interpretation of the Federal
Act.8 7 Thus, at the present, it can be expected that, in most
cases, arbitration will be ordered as long as it is shown that an
arbitration agreement exists between the parties and that it has
some arguable relationship to the dispute in question.
C.

Arbitration Agreement Based Upon Invalid Contract

In order to be enforceable, an arbitration agreement must, of
course, be valid as a contract. 8

Consequently, a party resisting

83 266 Minn. 284, 289, 123 N.W.2d 371, 375.
84 MINN. STAT. §572.09 (1971); UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT

85 266 Minn. 284, 289, 291-92, 127 N.W.2d 371, 375-77.
added.)

§2.
(Enphasis

86 E.g., Flood v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 2d 91, 242 N.E.2d
149 8(1968).
7
E.g., Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1967); Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382

(2d Cir. 1961).

88 DOMKE §1.01.
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arbitration may raise in a proceeding to compel arbitration fraud,
duress, failure of consideration, cancellation, rescission or other
recognized defenses to the enforcement of a contract. 9 Once
such a defense is raised, what has been termed the problem of
"separability" may be presented.9 0
At first glance it would appear that since an arbitration
clause is almost invariably a part of a larger contract, any claim
made as to the invalidity of the entire contract would naturally
go to the validity of the arbitration provision contained in the
contract and that the court would thus be required to determine
the question of the validity of the arbitration provision. The
state courts which have considered the question have generally
adopted this view.91 The federal courts, however, have adopted
what is known as the "separability doctrine"9 2 whereby an arbitration provision may be "separable" from the remainder of the
contract in which it is contained for the purpose of determining
contractual validity. In other words, if an issue is raised which
goes to the validity of the entire agreement, those issues will be
resolved by the arbitrator8 and only if an issue as to the validity
of the making of the arbitration clause itself is raised, will the
court consider the issue of validity.
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co.,9' the
Supreme Court explicitly recognized and applied the doctrine of
"separability," thus resolving a conflict among the circuits on the
question 9 and eliminating any doubts there may have been as to
the applicability of the doctrine in the federal courts in proceedings under the Federal Act.
In that case, Prima entered into a contract with F.&C. to
purchase an interstate paint business. In connection with the
purchase contract, the parties also entered into a consulting
agreement which contained a broad arbitration agreement covering "[any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
8

9 See 17 C.J.S. Contracts §§132-88 (1963).
90 See generally Comment Federal Arbitration Act and Application of
the "Separability Doctrine" in the Federal Courts, 1968 DUKE L.J. 588

(1968).
91E.g., Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotnick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366,
163 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1957); Finsilver, Still & Moss. Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas &
Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 389, 171 N.E. 579, 581 (1930) ; see generally, DOMKE
§§8.03-.05.
92 See note 90 supra.
98 Assuming, of course, that the arbitration clause covers "all disputes"
or contains similar language broad enough to cover matters such as contract
validity. See note 4 supra.
94'388 U.S. 395 (1967) (discussed in Section IV hereof supra in connection with the "commerce" requirement of the Federal Act).
95 Compare Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics Inc., 271 F.2d
402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S.
801 (1960) with Lummus Co. v. dommomwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915,
923-24 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960).
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agreement." A controversy thereafter arose between the parties
under the consulting agreement and F.&C. sought arbitration
pursuant to the agreement. Prima then instituted an action in the
federal court seeking rescission of the consulting agreement on
the grounds that it had been induced to enter into the consulting
agreement on the basis of fraudulent representations by Prima as
to Prima's financial condition. F.&C. moved for a stay of the suit
under Section 3 of the Federal Act pending arbitration and in
opposition to the motion for a stay, Prima argued that there was
no agreement to arbitrate inasmuch as the entire consulting
agreement had been fraudulently induced.
The district court granted F.&C.'s motion for a stay of
Prima's action for rescission pending arbitration and the Court
of Appeals denied leave to appeal.
In affirming the Court of Appeals, the Court pointed out
that the central issue in the case was "whether a claim of fraud
in the inducement of the entire contract is to be resolved by the
federal court, or whether the matter is to be referred to the
arbitrators.1' 6 After noting that the Courts of Appeals had
reached different results on the question, the Court concluded
that:
With respect to cases brought in federal court involving maritime
contracts or those evidencing contracts in 'commerce,' we think
that Congress has provided an explicit answer. That answer is to
be found in §4 of the Act, which provides a remedy to a party seeking to compel compliance with an arbitration agreement. Under
§4, with respect to a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal
court save for the existence of an arbitration clause, the federal
court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfled that 'the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply [with the arbitration agreementi is not in issue.' Accordingly, if the claim is fraud the inducement of the
arbitration clause itself - an issue which goes to the 'making'
of the agreement to arbitrate - the federal court may proceed to
adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the
federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the
contract generally. . . . We hold, therefore, that in passing upon

a §3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal
court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate. In so concluding, we not
only honor the plain meaning of the statute but also the unmistakeably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract,9 7 be speedy and not
subject to delay and obstruction in the courts.
The same rationale would be applicable to claims other than
fraud in the inducement i.e., duress, lack of consideration and the
96 388 U.S. at 402.
9 Id. at 403-04. (Emphasis

added.)
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other defenses going to the validity of a contract.98 Thus under
Prima, it is clear that the party who wishes to raise such a defense in a proceeding to compel arbitration under the Federal
Act must specifically allege that the arbitration provision is invalid and not merely that the entire agreement is invalid. As
indicated previously, the state courts apparently have not generally recognized the doctrine of "separability" or have not considered the question. Nevertheless, it would appear wise to specifically allege invalidity of the arbitration clause even in the
state courts since the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Prima
might well prove persuasive to a state court.
Arbitration Agreement Unenforcible for
Reasons of Public Policy
Another defense which has been successfully asserted is that
the dispute in question, for reasons of public policy is not one
that should be determined by arbitration. For example, in Wilko
v. Swan"" a customer brought an action for monetary damages
against a securities brokerage firm under the Civil Liabilities
Provision of the Security Act of 1933,100 alleging that defendant
had made various misrepresentations in connection with the
sale of securities. The defendant brokerage firm moved to stay
the trial pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Act until arbitration was had in accordance with terms of a margin agreement
between the parties. The stay was denied by the district court
but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the matter was
arbitrable. Relying upon Section 14 of the Securities Act of
1933101 and the basic policy of the Securities Act, the protection
of investors, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
and held that under the circumstances arbitration would be inappropriate. In reaching its conclusion, the Court pointed out
that:
D.

While a buyer and seller of securities, under some circumstances,
may deal at arms length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under
which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers in securities have
better opportunities to investigate and appraise the prospective
earnings and business plans affecting securities then buyers. It is

therefore reasonable for Congress to put buyers of securities covered by that Act on a different basis from other purchasers.
When the security buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities
Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would
a participant in other business transactions. The security buyer
98 Id. at 402 n. 8.
99 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
100 15 U.S.C.A. §§77a-77aa (1970).
101 15 U.S.C.A. §77n (1970).
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has a wider choice of courts in venue. He thus surrenders one of
the advantages the Act gives him and surrenders it at a time when
he is less able to judge the weight
of the handicap the Securities
2
Act places upon his adversary.10
In addition, the Court felt that valuable substantive advantages to the customer as well as procedural advantages would be
lost in the arbitration process if arbitrators were permitted to
apply the provisions of the Securities Act to the parties' dispute.
According to the court:
This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. As their award may be made without explanation
of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings,
the arbitrators conception of the legal meaning of such statutory
requirements as 'burden of proof', 'reasonable care' or 'material
fact', ... cannot be examined. Power to vacate an award is limited.
...
In unrestricted submissions, such as the present margin
agreement envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation." 3
A similar result was reached in American Safety Equip.
Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co.10 4 where one of the parties sought
arbitration, pursuant to a trademark license agreement between
them, of claims of federal antitrust violations. In reversing the
district court's order staying a court action between the parties
pending arbitration, the court stated:
A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter.
The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national interest in
a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights
under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who
protects the public's interest. Antitrust violations can affect
hundreds of thousands - perhaps millions - of people and inflict
staggering economic damage. . . . We do not believe that Congress intended such claims to be resolved elsewhere than in the
courts.105
In addition, the court found, as did the Court in Wilko, that
the arbitration process was not appropriate for the type of dispute involved. According to the Court:
[T]he issues in antitrust cases are prone to be complicated, and
the evidence extensive and diverse, far better suited to judicial
than to arbitration procedures. Moreover, it is the business community generally that it regulated by the antitrust laws. Since
346 U.S. at 435-37.
Id. at 437. Compare the decision in Wilco with Brown v. Gilligan
Will & Co., note 74 supra where the court held that the policy of the Securities
Act would not prevent the arbitration of a dispute between two members
of an exchange as opposed to a dispute between a member and an individual
customer inasmuch as members were not within the class of persons the
Securities Act was designed to protect.
104 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
105 Id. at 826-27.
102
10
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commercial arbitrators are frequently men drawn for their business expertise, it hardly seems proper for them to determine these
10 6
issues of great public interest.

E. Waiver of Right to Demand Arbitration
The party seeking arbitration may, by his own acts prior to
the filing of a petition to compel arbitration or a motion to stay a
proceeding pending arbitration, provide his opponent with a defense. This defense is commonly known as "waiver"' 0' 7 and generally arises where the parties seeking arbitration either filed a
lawsuit in violation of the arbitration agreement or participates
in a lawsuit initiated by his opponent without raising the arbitration agreement as a defense. As the court stated in Cornell
& Co., Inc. v. Barber & Ross Co.:
The right to arbitration, like any other contract right, can be
waived. A party waives his right to arbitrate when he actively
participates in a lawsuit or takes other action inconsistent with
that right. Once having waived the right to arbitrate, that party
is necessarily 'in default in proceeding with such arbitration'. 08

Where the party seeking arbitration has, prior to that time,
himself instituted a lawsuit in violation of the arbitration agreement, it is generally been held that this is an unequivocal manifestation of an intention not to arbitrate and a repudiation of
the arbitration agreement. 10 9 Thus, in Sussman v. Goldberg'"
plaintiff filed suit alleging the breach of a contract to purchase
stock. When defendants served their answer, plaintiff served
upon one of the defendants a demand for arbitration in accordance with the parties' agreement. Plaintiff thereafter moved
for a stay of the court proceeding he had instituted pending arbitration. In denying plaintiff's motion, the court stated that:
By bringing suit, a plaintiff generally irrevocably waives and abandons any right to arbitration. Unless compelled to do so, he cannot later change his mind and compel arbitration once he has
waived it by bringing the action."'

Where a defendant who has filed a counterclaim and other106 Id. at 827.

The term "waiver" is used herein in its literal sense i.e. the intentional
relinquishment of a know right or such conduct as warrants an inference of
the relinquishment of such right. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1751 (4th Ed.
1957). The term, however, is sometimes used more broadly by the courts to
include what is commonly thought of as "laches" or an unreasonable and
prejudicial delay in asserting a right. See Neechi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp.
v. Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665 (D.C.N.Y. 1966). The concept of laches as applied
to an action to compel arbitration is treated separately below.
108 860 F.2d 512, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
109 E.g., Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 19, 139 N.E. 764, 765 (1923)
Young v. Crescent Dev. Co., 240 N.Y. 244, 251, 148 N.E. 510, 511 (1925);
Annot., 161 A.L.R. 1426 (1946); but see Chatham Shipping Co. v. Fertax
S.S. Corp. 352 F.2d 291, 293 (2d Cir. 1965).
110 28 Misc. 2d 1070, 210 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1960).
"1 Id. at 1071, 210 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
107
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wise participates in a lawsuit later seeks a stay pending arbitra2
tion, a waiver is generally found."
Thus, in Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, Inc.'" the
defendant, who was sued for breach of a contract containing an
arbitration clause, filed an answer and also a counterclaim. The
case was set for trial but later postponed on the motion of defendant and on the condition that the case would be tried on the
adjourned date. When the case was called on the adjourned date
both parties answered ready for trial and defendant then moved
for the first time for a stay of the trial pending arbitration.
Under the circumstances, the court found that defendant had
waived his right to arbitration.
In Cornell and Co. Inc. v. Barber & Ross Co.' 4 the defendant
first sought to stay the court action pending arbitration after he
had moved for a change of venue, filed an answer to the complaint
and a counterclaim and had taken depositions and had successfully sought production of records and documents. Under the
circumstances, the court found that the defendant had waived
the right to seek arbitration.
However, where the defendant does not file a counterclaim,
he is generally in a better position to seek a stay pending arbitration.
In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,Inc.,1 5 the
defendant did not move for a stay pending arbitration pursuant
to the parties' agreement until almost nine months after the complaint was filed and after it had consented to the taking of the
deposition of its president, obtained information from plaintiff,
apparently through discovery processes, and had discussed settlement with plaintiff and tested the goods whose quality was the
subject of the parties' dispute. Despite this, the court found that
there was no waiver of arbitration, since defendant had demanded arbitration in its answer and that the intervening steps
taken by defendant were not inconsistent with its right to demand arbitration.
In G. H. & J. T. Kelly, Inc. v. Lorson Elect. Co." 6 defendant,
in its answer to plaintiff's complaint in a suit containing an arbitration clause, failed to set up the arbitration clause as a defense
or seek arbitration. After plaintiff served a notice of deposition
on defendant, defendant then moved for a stay of the action
pending arbitration. On the grounds that defendant's delay in
seeking arbitration was neither an unequivocal act constituting a
112 See .qenerally Annot. 161 A.L.R. 1426 (1946).

I's 97 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1938).
124 360 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
115 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
16 51 Misc. 2d 655, 273 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1966).
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waiver of arbitration nor prejudicial to plaintiff, the court
granted defendant's motion for arbitration.
F.

Delay in Seeking Arbitration

1. Statute of Limitations
In the absence of a statute to the contrary,' 17 the cases generally hold that the Statute of Limitations is not a bar to an order
compelling arbitration.
In Son Shipping Co. v. DeVosse & Tanghe,"8s plaintiff sought
to enjoin arbitration pursuant to a charter party containing an
arbitration provision and which also reserved to plaintiff all the
rights it would have under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 119
Plaintiff argued that, since the parties' dispute had arisen almost
two years before arbitration was demanded, the arbitration proceeding was barred by virtue of the one year statute of limitations for suits contained in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
This argument was rejected by the court, which held that:
[A]rbitration is not within the term 'suit' as used in that statute.
Instead, it is the performance of a contract providing for the resolution of a controversy without suit. 120
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,"' involved a declaratory judgment action by the
plaintiff architect for determination that a demand for arbitration made by the defendant building owner was barred by both a
three-year property damage and six-year contract statute of limitations. In May, 1953 plaintiff and defendant had entered into a
written contract whereby plaintiff was to render architectural
supervisory services in connection with the design and construction of a home office building for defendant. The contract provided for arbitration of "all questions in dispute under this agreement." Defendant occupied the building in early 1957 and in
early June, 1960, defendant became aware of defects in the air
conditioning system. Shortly thereafter plaintiff was notified.
Meetings were held to determine the cause of the defects and
necessary remedial measures but a mutually satisfactory resolution of the problem was not reached and in July, 1962, defendant
demanded arbitration.
In finding for defendant and dissolving plaintiff's temporary
injunction, the court held first that arbitration is not a common
law action and the institution of an arbitration proceeding is not
117 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §7502(b)

(McKinney 1962) provides that if

an action at law is barred, arbitration cannot be compelled.
118 199 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1952).
119 46 U.S.C.A. 1300 et seq. (1970).

110 199 F.2d at 689.
Conn. Supp. 76, 197 A.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. Hartford Cty. 1963).
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the "bringing of an action" under the various statutes of limitation. Further, the court held that even if a statute of limitations
was applicable to an arbitration proceeding, the applicability of
the statute and its effect was a matter to be determined by the
arbitrators rather than by the court. Finally, the court held that
the alleged breach continued until 1957 and that the demand for
arbitration was timely within the six-year contract statute of
limitations.
In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Harrison & Crossfield,
Ltd.,12 2 a government corporation entered into a contract in 1941
with defendant for a shipment of crude rubber from the East
Indies to the United States. One provision of the contract obligated the government corporation to take out insurance, but it
did not do so. Some of the shipments were sunk by enemy action
in 1942 and as a result, defendant suffered a loss due to the
failure to take out insurance. However, defendant did not serve
a demand for arbitration under the arbitration clause of the shipment contract until 1951, nine years after the loss had occurred.
The demand was made on RFC, the statutory successor to the
government corporation which had made the contract. RFC
then filed suit to enjoin defendant from arbitrating and defendant
crossclaimed to compel arbitration.
Plaintiff claimed that the New York six year statute of
limitations was applicable and that under that statute, defendants demand for arbitration was three years late. However, the
court differentiated between the performance of the obligation
involved on the merits, the obligation to obtain insurance, and
the performance the obligation to arbitrate. It held that with
the question of the nine year time lapse between the failure to
obtain insurance and the demand for arbitration was a question
for the arbitrators to decide. The court held that the only period that it could be concerned with was the one covering the
time period between the refusal of RFC to arbitrate pursuant to
the arbitration clause after demand had been made and the bringing of the court action to compel arbitration, since, according to
the court, the cause of action before it did not accrue until there
had been a refusal to arbitrate. Since the time lapse between
the refusal to arbitrate and the bringing of a court action was
substantially less than six years, the court found that the statute
of limitations was not a bar to arbitration.
2. Laches
The equitable doctrine of laches has generally been recognized as a defense to an action to compel arbitration. However,
122204 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 854 (1953).

96

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 5:72

a recent Second Circuit decision indicates that the scope of the
court's inquiry into this question on a petition to compel arbitration under the Federal Act is quite limited. In Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. InternationalMilling Co.,123 an action to compel arbi-

tration was brought in 1967 pursuant to an arbitration provision
contained in the charter party for damages to a vessel resulting
from an incident in 1961. The defendant claimed that plaintiff's
right to arbitrate was barred by laches and in support thereof
argued that plaintiff's long delay in asserting its claim had left
it powerless to defend itself before the arbitrators due to the
death of witnesses, loss of evidence and other difficulties. The
district court held that the question of laches was a matter to be
decided by the court rather than the arbitrators in a petition to
compel arbitration under the Federal Act, and that under the
circumstances plaintiff was barred by laches from seeking arbitration due to its prejudicial delay in demanding arbitration. In
reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals drew a distinction between laches pertaining to the issues which must be
decided by the arbitrators on the merits and laches as it pertains
to the limited issues which much be decided by the court in a
petition to compel arbitration under the Federal Act. According
to the court, it could consider only those questions of delay which
relate to and affect the limited issues the court is called upon to
decide under the Federal Act, namely, "the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect or refusal to perform
the same."' 124 Thus, in the court's view, if it were asserted that
the agreement for arbitration was procured through fraud or
duress, thus raising the issue of the "making of the arbitration
agreement" the court could consider whether evidence pertaining
to this defense had become lost or unavailable due to the unexcused delay of the moving party. However, with respect to a
claim that moving the party's delay would prejudice its opponent's defense on the merits, the court held that that is an issue
for the arbitrators to decide. According to the court:
This conclusion is consistent with the policy of the Arbitration
Act to eliminate the expense and delay of extended court proceedings preliminary to arbitration. Evils which surely would be
promoted by a rule which made all questions of laches for the court
especially where a full hearing is required [citation omitted] and
where, as here, an appeal is taken from the decision of the District

Court. Moreover, in our view, laches is not a technical legal issue
which only a judge is competent to decide. Rather, in the often
esoteric field of commercial dealings, and in admiralty, it would
seem that the severity of prejudice suffered through delay and the
reasonableness of excuses offered by the dilatory party, the ele123 401 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1968).
1249 U.S.C. §4 (1970).
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ments of laches, might be resolved
better where resort is had to
125
the expertise of the arbitrators.
However, in a number of earlier federal cases 126 and in cases

arising under the state arbitration acts, 12 7 the courts have generally been willing to consider the question of laches as it relates
both to the issues which the court must decide and the merits of
the dispute.
12 8
For example, in Sociedad Armadora Aristomenis Panama,
the court denied petitioner's motion to compel arbitration under
the Federal Act on the grounds that its unexcused delay in filing
the petition seriously prejudiced respondent in defending the
merits of the claim. The dispute there involved a claim that
stevedores had damaged a chartered vessel sometime prior to
April, 1957. The petitioner was aware of the claim in 1957 and
there was correspondence between the parties concerning it in
1959 and 1960. In 1960, after respondent had lost its right to
recover from the stevedores, respondent advised petitioner that
it was respondent's position that petitioner's claim was barred.
Petitioner did not answer respondent's last letter for three years
and did not demand arbitration until September, 1964. When
respondent declined to arbitrate, petitioner filed its petition to
compel arbitration. According to the court, petitioner was
barred by laches from seeking arbitration since:
. . . the petitioner comes forward with no explanation for the long
delay in demanding arbitration, while the respondent has lost, as
a result of it, the right to seek indemnity from the stevedores,
the party allegedly at fault. The respondent also notes the un-

availability of documents and the difficulty of unearthing witnesses who, at this late date, had any knowledge of the events.
Under these circumstances, there has been substantial prejudice
of laches bars the petitioner
to the respondent, and the doctrine
29
from compelling arbitration.
CONCLUSION
As a result of legislation and a change in the attitude of the
courts over the past 50 years, the machinery for enforcing an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes is now generally available. It is intended to further the goals of arbitration itself 225 401 F.2d at 572. Contra, Sussleaf-Flemington, Inc. v. Bruce, 84 N.J.
Super. 599, 203 A.2d 131 (1964).
126 E.g., Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Harrison and Crosfield, Ltd.,
204 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 854 (1953); World Brilliance
Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Nortuna Shipping
v. Isbrandtsen Co 231 F.2d 528 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 964 (1956).
12TE.g., Sussleaf-Flemington v. Bruce, note 125 supra.; New York
Central R.R. v. Erie R.R., 30 Misc. 2d 362, 213 N.Y.S.2d 15.
128 244 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

129 244 F. Supp. at 654-55.
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the simple and inexpensive resolution of disputes. But as demonstrated by the cases in the immediately preceding section, those
goals may not be realized if one of the parties refuses to submit
to arbitration and this is one of the factors which must be considered in deciding whether to include an arbitration provision
in a contract.

